They still have faith and trust with this that's it.
SkiznillyCrypto God | CC: 167 QC | ETH: 161 QC | REQ: 31 QC5 months ago
Gaming is definitely a great use case, but I prefer the decentralised approach of developing SDKs and letting many developers and game studios adopt them, rather than chucking a big amount of money at one hand-picked studio and hoping peeps go for them.
Several good gaming projects out there already that have already been building the benefits Novogratz is talking about. My fave is ENJ, they're pretty cool.
i know right? their call of duty held the record for $1bn in sales in first few opening days ... very repititive shit of a game! i would rather just have "partnerships" with unknown companies or at least claim to be partners with microsoft or alibaba (trx lol)
> i know right? their call of duty held the record for $1bn in sales in first few opening days ... very repititive shit of a game! i would rather just have "partnerships" with unknown companies or at least claim to be partners with microsoft or alibaba (trx lol)
shows exactly how much you know about the games industry
He aint wrong. Call of Duty might be shit but it sells like fucking crazy and they make *a lot* of money. EA is still making billions and billions of $ despite being "The most hated company in the world".
I'm quite sure even Diablo Immortal will be a hit. Sure their OG Diablo fans will be pissed but there are literally several hundred million phone users who can pick up the game and start spending small amounts in micro-transactions, thus making *way* more money than a regular PC Diablo would.
Don't underestimate Chinese gamers, they are a much larger market than we are and the companies don't give single fuck what you and I think of them as long as they make a shitload of money.
redmondj12 - 3 years account age. 150 - 300 comment karma.5 months ago
I love how dumb 99% of people who frequent this sub are.
Why not? Im not a fan of EOS at all, but people calling it a shitcoin are beyond delusional. Everything is shit right now, allegedly great projects like ETH do nothing but spawn useless cardgames and ico scams...yet EOS is a shitcoin. Everything is a useless shitcoin nobody uses right now.
Hasn't it been made obvious to you by observing every other sector of business (banking, tech, healthcare, autos, energy, etc.) that high-level decision makers are human and fallible just like you?
Do not rely on others to perform the due diligence for you. They are just as likely to make bad choices, they just have more pedigreed resumes.
Businesses using or partnering with EOS, or XRP, or <insert coin> shouldn't impact your decision very heavily. Did you invest in the Euro because you heard that Apple will begin to sell more products via that currency?
SoNElgenCrypto God | VEN: 79 QC | CC: 76 QC5 months ago
To be fair, trading the euro has been fairly profitable in the past 5 years.
As buggy than most other projects. it happens when you write a ton of new code to become one of the most developed C projects on github. It definitely does a lot & current leader in WASM smart contracts & tons of other capabilities no other blockchain is capable of, but you won't see any positive aspects upvoted in this subreddit.
You also won't see accurate criticism either like discussions of EOS being a premine scam because it might not be beneficial to other premine scams like Ethereum. So instead we get fictional problems at the top instead of real ones.
ChokemanCrypto God | ETH: 66 QC | QTUM: 38 QC | CC: 34 QC5 months ago
I'm not sure this is an appropriate application for EOS since those 21 nodes can edit blockchain history whenever they want.
They will probably be an issue of nodes holding users' assets as hostages againt game companies in the future.
Miners participating in a pool don't pick or validate transactions in general. Switching pools is no different than switching votes.
If you use a light client that only checks headers & rely on (easily sybiled) miner's nodes, you'll never know which chain you're mining either or even using until something fails on other end.
producing nodes are also made up of thousands of votes that can switch given at least 1/3 of bp nodes don't try to censor them.
pow is the best at permissionless switch, no doubt.
but when we start talking about PoS, it's very typical pos.
ChokemanCrypto God | ETH: 66 QC | QTUM: 38 QC | CC: 34 QC4 months ago
>Switching pools is no different than switching votes.
it's very different. those nodes can form a cartel and vote for each other.
look at what has happened to Lisk, 2 cartels are owning something like 95% of hashpower and there's no way to resolve this except hardfork.
does EOS have any mechanism to prevent this from happening ? i don't think so and i believe from the leak Telegram chat, those BPs are doing it right now.
> those nodes can form a cartel and vote for each other
Cartels can form on any chain w/o even having to vote. dpos or lpos or mining pool operator nodes are elected w/o having your own wealth.
They don't because of incentives of future income which disappears if they are malicious. and it only matters if they are malicious. dpos has the harshest punishment for being voted out - all future income for rest of time reduced to 0.
Cartels can be completely voted out by majority on-chain or, worst case just like in all PoS, chain can hard fork the malicious stake out resulting in similar. In PoW this requires switching algorithms.
> look at what has happened to Lisk
lisk is not a regular dpos, they have way too many producing nodes so elections are hard for runner ups, and they built in reward that you get from voting ONLY for top nodes. (no hashpower in lisk) and they can resolve it with hf which would kill future profits, so clearly lisk "cartel" isn't malicious. working together towards a common goal is not a cartel, that's what most blockchains try to achieve by making it more profitable to play along.
> EOS have any mechanism to prevent this from happening
incentives, like everywhere else.
- something at stake for voters
- job at stake for bp
EOS is shit because it's the first dpos chain I know of that allows BP to change account ownership w/o voter review - imo that's insane. I have no idea why they went that way. White paper suggesting 30-60 day review is either not implemented yet or just misleading apparently.
ChokemanCrypto God | ETH: 66 QC | QTUM: 38 QC | CC: 34 QC4 months ago
> Cartels can form on any chain w/o even having to vote. dpos or lpos or mining pool operator nodes are elected w/o having your own wealth.
it's almost impossible to own something like 95% of hashpower or 95% of staking weight (in case of PoS) unless you're goddamn rich while it's very possible to own 95% of vote turnout since the turnout rate for any DPoS chain is around 15-20%, Lisk's is in this range. i believe the same applies for EOS also.
that's why cartels are formed easily on DPoS chains.
>so clearly lisk "cartel" isn't malicious. working together towards a common goal is not a cartel, that's what most blockchains try to achieve by making it more profitable to play along.
if you're trying to say "even though this chain is plagued by cartels, it's still fine since those cartels haven't acted maliciously yet".
why don't we just use PayPal, AWS, Alipay, etc. ? yep, those services are 100% centralized but they aren't maliciously at least to me either.
> incentives, like everywhere else.
So similar to Lisk. no wonder those shitty companies like Bitmain, Bitfinex, etc. are forming a cartel on EOS right now.
just fyi I'm just discussing this and thinking it through, I never want to come off as saying dpos is superior design, just point out its strengths and trade-offs. if you don't want to read a lot, just ignore this :)
> it's almost impossible to own something like 95% of hashpower or 95% of staking weight (in case of PoS) unless you're goddamn rich while it's very possible to own 95% of vote turnout since the turnout rate for any DPoS chain is around 15-20%, Lisk's is in this range. i believe the same applies for EOS also.
that's why cartels are formed easily on DPoS chains.
If I understand, you're critical about distribution. I totally agree & in general PoS provides worse distributions the bigger the barrier to entry is, but this is why so many used to start with PoW before switching.
dpos isn't focused on distribution, some dpos like bts don't even have inflation, it's treating producers as just hired workers along other workers like developers its hiring using the dao payout.
I think they could do better by also rewarding those who risk their stake - the voters, but not from producers bribes but for locking stake like in most PoS. I also think you must have permissionless entry to distribution which PoS cannot offer but PoW can. I like PoW/PoS mixed designs in various forms we've seen that give benefits of both to some degree like decred, (old)steem
Note in normal dpos the runner ups get paid too so they are ready to serve as replacements & incentivized to keep watchful eye over top producers.
This summarizes the logic behind control - https://i.imgur.com/7CzCiwf.png
Imo no dpos chain has fully addressed the incentives countering it to full extent but they do have incentives but I think it's overplayed and there's no real evidence. It's just something people speculate on usually or in Lisk case something their weird community always supports on protocol level unlike others. A lot of criticism generally applied can be applied on any chain.
If we're talking about consensus, remember that 49% of hash power or active stake in consensus in general doesn't play a significant role as their input is ignored long term.
Biggest enormous EOS issue is same as in so many others. The 51% of stake that matters is already at risk due to being centrally printed by 1 trusted party (more like 100% lol).
I prefer approval voting used by dpos to plurality myself as its better for elections:
It's very important for incentives that misbehaving pool nodes are removed completely in dpos to cause maximum damage. dpos approval voting allows removal of cartel with 20% of stake with 20.1% of stake coming from any number of addresses - that's its strength. It's the only incentive in all designs in crypto which is infinite in scale after you lose income for rest of time. You can game slashing rules of finite amounts with leverage but you cannot game infinity.
> if you're trying to say "even though this chain is plagued by cartels, it's still fine since those cartels haven't acted maliciously yet".
I see no evidence of cartel. Working together towards common goal is not a cartel. When miners build on a block by another miner they are voting for them in a sense too. Miners could all switch to same pool node and it would effectively be like voting for each other. BP voting for some of each other (if they even have what to vote with) makes perfect sense as the entire point of voting is to protect the value of your stake by picking the best BP to help keep/improve its value by keeping/improving platforms value.
> why don't we just use PayPal, AWS, Alipay, etc. ? yep, those services are 100% centralized but they aren't maliciously at least to me either.
good question. 21 bp is more than 1 so it's somewhat decentralized. but you're saying if its a cartel, single entity, isn't it centralized? you know what? yes it could be.
but if those services are malicious you can't do anything.
before EOS they also couldn't do anything you couldn't undo. EOS is a lot weirder than white paper makes you believe and imo they need to undo it.
if bp are malicious, you can vote and change them & they take infinite opportunity cost. and if you can't, either the platform falls in value so all the bonded stake bp were voting with falls as well (much like miner hardware), their income falls for long time if chain is trashed, and all the honest voters/users are incentivized to reform blockchain without the stake of the malicious party. Note the last version is true for all PoS. So far there are always ways to be malicious for producing nodes in various networks in countless ways but in general this is handled by incentives.
I actually agree with you that currently EOS fucked up in this regard by doing on-chain governance in a way that's not reviewed by voters. I dislike tezos in general, but forgot his name in it had a great point that on-chain governance doesn't mean it has to be easy, it's just there to provide an alternative for hard fork governance (that's highly abstract and undefined and easily manipulated in opaque markets).
> no wonder those shitty companies like Bitmain, Bitfinex, etc. are forming a cartel on EOS right now.
Lisk incentives are different, they force bribery & don't pay runner ups & no lock time for stake either (I could be wrong). I don't see any evidence of cartels. If I was on EOS, I'd support them. Many of them have good hardware knowledge, well organized, provide bare metal parallel servers with many secure gateways. The BP are hired to provide very strong hardware backbone.
I'd consider the downsides of other versions of PoS that are direct plutocracies instead of representative plutocracies, especially with respect to how centralized wealth always is naturally (pareto)
Anyway, imo PoW and PoW/PoS are my favorite systems so far, but out of pure PoS, I haven't seen any proposals better than dpos (not EOS/lisk) but it has serious liveness problem & there's TONS of room to improve.
ChokemanCrypto God | ETH: 66 QC | QTUM: 38 QC | CC: 34 QC4 months ago
have you ever looked at Lisk community ?
even the community really want to vote those cartels out, they can't because those cartels are so big so they can vote for each other to be block producers.
cartels' votes easily outweigh community's votes.
very low vote turnout is also a cause of this issue since most people just leave their coins on exchanges. they even bother voting. that's why the chain is easily dominated by some groups of people.
and only solution to this issue is a hardfork which the devs are too scared to do it since it may cause a huge drama which will definitely affect token price at least short-mid term.
anyway thx for your good discussion.
Thanks, I'm not familiar with Lisk, so this info helps.
I know dpos networks were always worried that lisk will be used as a strawman against all dpos and I guess their worries are realized. e.g. https://medium.com/coinmonks/lisk-the-mafia-blockchain-47248915ae2f was used as example few times now.
It was strange how they copied a very old version of dpos missing stuff like DAO and added many bad design decisions so I avoided it and Ark for similar reasons.
If they have trouble voting them out, and majority of minority doesn't want them, it means the stake is compromised. They should reform the chain w/o malicious stake.
In general you always have pretty low turn outs for staking or voting. I just checked Lisk & see ~40% which is actually on the high side for typical participation. There's a lot of fear in general in mining or staking how much of it is passive set and forget.
I'm reading up on lisk more now and I see you have 101 active delegates and you're only allowed to cast 101 votes. That's crazy! Why would anybody even vote for runner up when you only get paid for voting for top 101. Every part of lisk design wrt dpos screams no attention was paid to incentives.
Note Dan dpos allow more votes then there are top producing nodes. 33 is often picked because it is more than 21 so it allows voting out malicious whales completely (e.g. @berniesanders on steem) but it's less than the few hundred or so typical runner ups so can't vote runner ups completely out.
Rational voters seeing block producers giving away money would rather replace them with producers with lower salary, but if doing so costs you $ in lisk, that's just bad design.
The problem is if the premine devs start weighting in on which chain is real or try to influence fork decisions, which it sounds like is the problem. And you're right about price short-mid term fear as well.
If you want to incentivize proper voting there are several paths:
* pay everyone who stakes, not based on who they vote for. this makes it way more expensive to bribe
* give a reason to vote other than voting - new dpos require locked stake for long time to use the blockchain or to host contracts which requires voting to keep it safe. now it's not just users w/ interest to vote but those hosting useful things. if you pay anyone who stakes, not voting for best candidates puts value of their stake at risk. worst case, they can wait to vote until there's an emergency which is when it really matters anyway
* proxies end up like web of trust (w/o giving anyone your stake) which simplifies voting for those with little time
* ffs allow more votes than active producing pools (wtf lisk)
* include projection in voting - if producer you vote for goes up over time, get a little more reward. if producer you vote for goes down over time, get a little less reward. this gives incentive to rotate producers and respond to news for profit. it also reduces votes for top producers as they can't go up much anymore. you're not getting paid to vote for someone specific, but for paying attention & accurate speculation on their performance.
* ffs make sure votes time-out over time to force participation, make people at least show they still have private key, and not just set and forget (lisk doesn't do this, no idea why)
* increase reward at low participation - incentive to stake more
* burn coins when possible (e.g. ram trading) so people are less dependent on bribes to avoid inflation.
* actively test runner ups, steem does this by selecting random runner up every 21 blocks for 1 block so voters can see real data on how they perform. this also helps break various ties that can happen.
* have a DAO that funds work on the platform outside BP's, which would exist on every fork & gives no advantage to 1 fork.
* it really helps if voting is free for those with few coins, use dpos bandwidth model in addition to or instead of just fee model
There's so much interesting stuff they could be doing to fix their issues. It's a very cool structure to work with.
ZombaitCrypto God | EOS: 139 QC | CC: 71 QC5 months ago
Decentralization is the process by which the activities of an organization, particularly those regarding planning and decision-making, are distributed or delegated away from a central, authoritative location or group.
2 is technically decentralised. 6 Mining pools are decentralised. 21 Block producers are decentralised.
UnknownEssenceCrypto God | EOS: 89 QC | CC: 60 QC | ETH: 41 QC5 months ago
That not what strawman means.
> an intentionally misrepresented proposition that is set up because it is easier to defeat than an opponent's real argument.
poweruser456Crypto God | EOS: 141 QC | BTC: 21 QC | CC: 18 QC5 months ago
This subreddits full of broke salty shitcoin brigadiers lol of course they’ll steer you away from the project with the most developments and into their Nano garbage. I like how you worded it though, the deadheads won’t catch on to the sarcasm and might upvote it.
In total honesty, this is the first interesting legit prospective thing Ive seen from EOS, aside from the $4 billion. This is a use case that makes sense for them, and can be overwhelmed and dominated by their pile of money and people, and Activision.
Pewter_Pawn9 - 10 years account age. > 1000 comment karma.5 months ago
You do not find online gambling on smartcontracts prosperous? Its revolutionary?
Thats the point, all of it is bullshit but very few projects are doing anything and unfortunately for most of the idiots on /cc EOS is one of them
Its ok they'll fomo in when the next bullrun happens when it 4x from here