Over the last few years there has been an increasing interest in using deliberately engineered economic incentives and mechanism design to align behavior of participants in various contexts.
“This fact, the instability of majority games under cooperative game theory, is arguably highly underrated as a simplified general mathematical model of why there may well be no ‘end of history’ in politics” https://t.co/36NaMWK7p1
”If one tries ... building a system where identities don’t matter and only coins do, there is an impossible tradeoff between either failing to incentivize legitimate public goods or over-subsidizing plutocracy.”
-@VitalikButerin on collusion & mechanisms
To increasingly resist collusion would be to make collusion increasingly costly.
I think the technology and infrastructure is still lacking to facilitate this.
For a rootchain, the onchain governance would have to be as minimal as possible, with regard to consensus; increasing onchain governance opens up more pathways for collusion with relatively low costs.
For a rootchain, the greater the distribution of miners and producers, the more cost to collusion. But the internet infrastructure would have to change that can enable much more protection of identity as well as throughput; and blockchain security has to have lower barriers of entry and strong incentives. Enabling more factions to exist means greater distribution of power existing under more balance systems; collusion or coercion attempts and maintaining power have greater costs with flawed decisions posing greater risks of existing powers being overthrown.
There would also have to be base rootchain laws that everyone would uphold. Such as immutability of rootchain transactions: forking and special contracts aside, cryptographically secured transactions that can't be reversed or frozen, etc; or near immutabilities or whatever community decides.
A fantastical future sci-fi technology to better control collusion, and also related to governance, would be something like Inception, except instead of dreams, it's a decentralized cyberworld. Humans and nonhuman intelligence existing in various layers of cyber realities with different timestreams. Humans are able to split their consciousness across multiple avatars; and on the 7th layer with time factor of 1mil, avatars spend decades become subject matter experts on every voting issue, and on the 8th layer or beyond, simulations play out to enact consequences of various decisions.
>For example, one could have an ecosystem of “issuers” where each issuer issues smart cards with private keys
This is one of the reasons why I'm so excited about eSIM cards. SIM cards are getting replaced with special chips called eSIMs that are built for the next generation mobile network. An eSIM is a smart card, but one which is specifically built for the needs of the global communications industry. What makes this chip so relevant here is it introduces a novel public-key infrastructure, with an insane level of checks and balances. Device manufacturers must undergo rigorous security audits (by multiple parties) before they can be "certified", and every device is cryptographically signed. Then there is also certification done by the network operator.
What you have then is potentially a Sybil-safe identity system that will be used in billions of future devices. Typically operators also have their own KYC process, so a decentralized system could actually bootstrap off the global mobile system in the future. Of course, this won't 100% guarantee that collusion isn't possible, but if you read up on how it works I think we can all agree its a massive step up from relying on random Reddit accounts for upvotes. This technology has immense applications, I'm talking fairer ICOs, novel proof-of-burn algorithms (you can permanently destroy secure smart card circuits with repeated false logins, so literal cryptographic proof that a device is utterly useless, not bad), and so on.
Fair, but I work in the mobile industry and I hate eSims. Why? No good reason. But the numeric code is fucking long and my scanner doesn't always work. Do you know how annoying it is to type in a full eSIM serial number on a shitty iPad?
woga121 - 2 years account age. 200 - 1000 comment karma.2 weeks ago
This is the problem of decentralised system.
Hopefully we will see solutions soon.
Prediction markets in combination with some kind of voting system seems quite solid for now.
If you have an honest Reputation base wouldn’t it be possible to build a large network around ?
The longterm goal should be completely decentralised but I mean if vitalik, maxwell and Larimer trusts x and woods , Graig and mcceb trust y and x y trust z etc. ?
Great time to try out Cent.co and learn how we abstracted out the need for a token altogether and just use ETH and meta state channels to send value in our network. Social incentive primitives are powerful when they’re together. Here’s a cool graphic that explains https://twitter.com/steven_mckie/status/1111813957843480576?s=21
"Bribing attacks may sound farfetched (who here has ever accepted a bribe in real life?), but in a mature ecosystem they are much more realistic than they seem. In most contexts where bribing has taken place in the blockchain space, the operators use a euphemistic new name to give the concept a friendly face: it’s not a bribe, it’s a “staking pool” that “shares dividends”. Bribes can even be obfuscated: imagine a cryptocurrency exchange that offers zero fees and spends the effort to make an abnormally good user interface, and does not even try to collect a profit; instead, it uses coins that users deposit to participate in various coin voting systems. There will also inevitably be people that see in-group collusion as just plain normal; see a recent scandal involving EOS DPOS for one example:"
It can even be called _"trying not to go to jail"_. In case there is a risk to be identified, a more powerful entity will try and coerce entities to behave in a certain way by threatening with violence (['sanctions'](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm556)).
Very very interesting and exactly what I said multiples times (in much less scientific terms!): all dApps allowing user inputs are currently a big utopia! They will get spammed and exploited to death as soon as there will be enough usage/incentive!
The shout-out to donuts is great but u/vbuterin has the history wrong. The bridge stayed up and u/shouldbdan took it down over fear of legal liability. The real community response was to change the voting model to rely on "locked" donuts. Basically your voting weight in gov polls is only from your earned donuts - not buyable. I think there is a slight flaw in rep-only voting like this if that voting also has control over a currency token - a user could sell all their currency but maintain maximum influence. r/daonuts seeks to address this by incorporating both the currency and the karma and using the minimum between them for weighting - you cannot buy above what you originally earned but if you sell all then you also lose your influence over that currency.
Thank you for the article! The sybil/identity issue that the current donuts system has is something I would very much like to address. At the moment upvotes (or downvotes) from any account contribute towards the distributions. This leaves the door wide open for a track so to speak. A perhaps crude but quite easy mitigation could be to restrict the pool of members whose votes *count* (for purposes of distribution) to those who have achieved some threshold karma. That threshold acts to increase the cost of the sybil attack. This creates an incentive to only achieve this threshold and then switch to a new account. So maybe they need to decay too! It's also occurred to me that a social/dao mechanism could play a role. If content voting were public then vote patterns could be analyzed and manipulators called out (banned and karma revoked by dao vote).